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In extracting predictions from theories that describe a multiverse, we face the difficulty that we
must assess probability distributions over possible observations, prescribed not just by an underly-
ing theory, but by a theory together with a conditionalization scheme that allows for (anthropic)
selection effects. This means we usually need to compare distributions that are consistent with a
broad range of possible observations, with actual experimental data. One controversial means of
making this comparison is by invoking the ‘principle of mediocrity’: that is, the principle that we
are typical of the reference class implicit in the conjunction of the theory and the conditionalization
scheme. In this paper, I quantitatively assess the principle of mediocrity in a range of cosmological
settings, employing ‘xerographic distributions’ to impose a variety of assumptions regarding typical-
ity. I find that for a fixed theory, the assumption that we are typical gives rise to higher likelihoods
for our observations. If, however, one allows both the underlying theory and the assumption of
typicality to vary, then the assumption of typicality does not always provide the highest likelihoods.
Interpreted from a Bayesian perspective, these results support the claim that when one has the
freedom to consider different combinations of theories and xerographic distributions (or different
‘frameworks’), one should favor the framework that has the highest posterior probability; and then
from this framework one can infer, in particular, how typical we are. In this way, the invocation of
the principle of mediocrity is more questionable than has been recently claimed.
I. INTRODUCTION
A generic prediction of the theories that underpin our
current understanding of the large-scale structure of the
universe, is that the observable universe is not all that
exists, and that we may be part of a vast landscape of
(as yet) unobserved domains where the fundamental con-
stants of nature, and perhaps the effective laws of physics
more generally, vary. The predominant approach to char-
acterizing this variability rests on theory-generated prob-
ability distributions that describe the statistics of con-
stants associated with the standard models of particle
physics and cosmology. The hope remains that plausible
descriptions of such multi-domain universes (henceforth
‘multiverses’), generated, for example, from inflationary
cosmology [1–3] or the string theory landscape [4–7], will
yield prescriptions for calculating these distributions in
unambiguous ways. Subsequent comparisons with our
observations would allow us to ascertain which multiverse
models are indeed favored.
To be more precise, one expects theories that describe
a multiverse to set down a likelihood for observations we
might make, given both the theory under consideration,
and conditions that restrict the vast array of domains to
ones in which we might arise. This latter conditionaliza-
tion is naturally couched in terms of conditions necessary
for the existence of ‘us’, as defined by relevant features
of the theory. The need for such ‘anthropic’ condition-
alization, as captured, for example, in what has become
known as Carter’s ‘Weak Anthropic Principle’ [8], is pred-
icated on the presumption that most of the domains de-
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scribed by theories of the multiverse will not give rise to
the specialized structures we see around us, nor indeed
to complex biological life [9]. Under this scenario any ob-
servation we might make conditionalized on theory alone,
would prove to be unlikely; and one should therefore re-
strict one’s attention to relevant domains so as to secure
relevant probabilities for possible observations.
An appropriate conditionalization scheme might make
our observations more likely: but how likely should they
be, before we can count them as having been successfully
predicted by the conjunction of a theory and a condition-
alization scheme? One proposed solution to this problem
is known as the ‘principle of mediocrity’ [10]: in more
current terminology, it assumes that we should reason as
though we are typical members of a suitable reference
class (see also [11–13]). Under this assumption, for ap-
propriately conditionalized distributions, as long as our
observations are within some ‘typical’ range according
to the distribution, we can count them as being success-
fully predicted. The assessment of this assumption is the
topic of this paper, and constitutes a central concern in
extracting predictions from any theory of the multiverse.
The principle of mediocrity, or the ‘assumption of
typicality’—as it will also be referred to in this paper—is
not without its critics [14–16]. A key issue involves how
one defines the reference class with respect to which we
are typical [17]. This problem is even more stark given
our ignorance of who or what we are trying to charac-
terize, and the precise physical constraints we need to
implement in order to do so [14, 18].
Rather than assessing this principle from a primarily
conceptual point of view, we propose to test it quantita-
tively. In particular, we investigate how well it does in
terms of accounting for our data in comparison to other
assumptions regarding typicality, in a restricted set of
2multiverse cosmological scenarios. We do this by extend-
ing the program of Srednicki and Hartle [19] to explore
a variety of assumptions regarding typicality, building
these assumptions into likelihoods for possible observa-
tions through the use of ‘xerographic distributions’ (in
the terminology of Srednicki and Hartle [19]). The goal
then is to find the conjunction of a theory and a xero-
graphic distribution (which they call a ‘framework’) that
gives rise to the highest likelihoods for our data.
I will show that (1) for a fixed theory, the assump-
tion that we are typical gives rise to higher likelihoods
for our observations; but (2) if one allows both the un-
derlying theory and the assumption of typicality to vary,
then the assumption of typicality does not always provide
the highest likelihoods. Interpreted from a Bayesian per-
spective, these results provide support for the claim that
one should try to identify the framework with the highest
posterior probability; and then from this framework, one
can infer how typical we are.
The structure of this paper is as follows. In section II, I
outline the general formalism within which I will be inves-
tigating assumptions regarding typicality, including the
introduction of a statement of the principle of mediocrity
adapted to our specific purposes. Section III introduces
the multiverse model we will analyze (which is a general-
ization of the cosmological model of Srednicki and Hartle
[19]), derives the central equations for relevant likelihoods
from which we will eventually test assumptions regarding
typicality, and shows that these likelihoods reduce to the
results of Srednicki and Hartle [19] under the appropriate
simplifying assumptions. Explicit tests of the principle of
mediocrity are presented in section IV, and we conclude
in section V with a discussion of the context in which one
should interpret the results of these tests. So I turn first
to a description of the general formalism within which I
will be working.
II. XEROGRAPHIC DISTRIBUTIONS
A. Generalities
I begin by outlining the formalism of Srednicki and
Hartle [19], recasting relevant parts of their discussion to
suit our computations in the next section.
In general multiverse scenarios, it is possible that any
reference class of which we believe we are a member, may
have multiple members. Indeed, it is plausible that our
accumulated data D0, which gives a detailed description
of our physical surroundings, might be replicated at dif-
ferent spacetime locations in the multiverse. A theory T
describing this multiverse scenario, will, in principle, gen-
erate a likelihood for this data which we will denote by
P (D0|T ). This corresponds to a ‘third-person’ likelihood
in the terminology of Srednicki and Hartle [19]—that is,
a likelihood that does not include any information about
which member of our reference class we might be. The
quantity that takes this indexical information into ac-
count is a ‘first-person’ likelihood and will be denoted by
P (1p)(D0|T , ξ), in accordance with the notation of Sred-
nicki and Hartle [19]. The added ingredient here is the
xerographic distribution ξ, a probability distribution that
we specify by assumption, that encodes our belief about
which member of our reference class we happen to be. Its
functional form is independent of a given theory T , and
together with such a theory, constitutes a ‘framework’
(T , ξ) (in the notation of [19]). Thus the transition from
a third-person likelihood P (D0|T ) to a first-person like-
lihood P (1p)(D0|T , ξ) is effected by two ideas: (i) the
conditionalization scheme, which (as mentioned in sec-
tion I) specifies our reference class, and (ii) a probability
distribution over members of our reference class.
In the case where there exist L members of our refer-
ence class at spacetime locations xl for l = 1, 2, . . . , L,
we let the probability that we are the member at loca-
tion xl be denoted by ξl. So the xerographic distribution
is just the sequence of probabilities ξ := {ξl}
L
l=1, and
will always be chosen so that it is normalized to unity:∑L
l=1 ξl = 1. We will assume throughout this paper that
the total number of members L is finite.
The assumption that we are a typical member of this
reference class, is then the statement that the probability
that we are any one of these members is the same, and
thus the xerographic distribution is given by the uniform
distribution: ξl =
1
L
. Correspondingly, the assumption
that we are atypical of this reference class will be given by
xerographic distributions that deviate from the uniform
distribution.
How then do we propose to compute the first-person
likelihood P (1p)(D0|T , ξ)? To do so, we will introduce a
few conventions that will form the basis of the general
discussion here, and also the basis of the more specific
examples we will pursue in the following two sections.
Assume then that there exists a finite set of N distinct
domains in a multiverse, within each of which ‘observers’
may exist with some probability that may depend on the
particular domain being considered. We will only track
the existence or non-existence of observers in each do-
main, without concerning ourselves with issues such as:
whether or not these observers are anything like ‘us’1,
precisely where in these domains these observers might
be located, and how many observers might exist in a do-
main. We thereby consider only whether a domain has
observers in it or does not. Thus, there exists a total of
2N possible configurations of observers in domains across
the entire multiverse. We will denote each such config-
uration by an N -dimensional vector ~σ of binary digits,
where σi = 1 denotes the existence of observers in do-
main i, and σi = 0 denotes there are no observers in
1 The simplicity of the scenarios we will consider makes this less
egregious an assumption than it would otherwise be. Indeed, as
mentioned in section I, definitions of observers and the subse-
quent specification of appropriate reference classes is a thorny
issue, but we will not need to engage with it here (see [16] for
further discussion).
3that domain. The set of all such configurations ~σ will be
denoted by K, and we will denote the probability of a
configuration ~σ by P (~σ).
We live inside one of these domains and observe some
data. Let D0 denote the data that there exist observers
who see this same data. We will take a theory T to
describe an observable fact about each domain: in the
model introduced in section III, this will be the value of
a binary quantity. So the probabilities P (~σ) will be given
in general, independently of T . But T will determine the
subset KD0 (T ) of those configurations ~σ in which D0 is
observed (KD0 (T ) ⊂ K). The sum of the probabilities of
the configurations ~σ belonging to the subset KD0(T ), is
just the theory-generated third-person likelihood for our
data: P (D0|T ) =
∑
~σ∈KD0(T )
P (~σ). This specifies the
likelihood that there is at least one observing system in
the multiverse that witnesses the data D0.
To derive a first-person likelihood, we need to assume a
xerographic distribution by firstly specifying a reference
class that could plausibly describe ‘us’. Two natural ref-
erence classes to consider (which we will further develop
in section III), following [19], are (i) the reference class
of all observers who witness our data D0, and (ii) the
reference class of all observers (who do not necessarily
see our data D0). In either case, for any particular pos-
sible observer configuration ~σ, the xerographic distribu-
tion encodes the probability that we are the reference-
class member at some specified location. Owing to the
simplicity of our model, a ‘location’ will correspond to
a multiverse domain. In general, for a given T and
given ~σ ∈ KD0(T ), only a subset of locations LD0(~σ, T ),
will contain observers who see our data D0. From these
considerations, we can write down the appropriate first-
person likelihood P (1p)(D0|T , ξ) as follows:
P (1p)(D0|T , ξ) :=
∑
~σ∈KD0(T )
P (~σ)
∑
l′∈LD0(~σ,T )
ξl′ . (1)
To be clear, for each configuration ~σ in the above sum
over configurations, one needs to compute the appropri-
ately normalized xerographic distribution, subsequently
summing that distribution over only those locations that
could indeed correspond to us.2
We note that for the reference class of all observers who
witness our data D0 (called (i) above): for each theory
T and each configuration ~σ ∈ KD0(T ), the subset of lo-
cations that contain observers who witness our data D0,
namely LD0(~σ, T ), is the entirety of the set of locations
over which the xerographic distribution can be nonzero.
2 The notation adopted in Eq. (1) is not to be confused with the
claim that the theory in any way determines the xerographic
distribution—it does not. We are simply spelling out how our
assumptions regarding which possible member of a suitable ref-
erence class we might be, enter into the determination of first-
person likelihoods. This will become clearer when we consider
concrete cosmological scenarios below—see Eq. (5) for a preview.
Thus, by the normalization condition the xerographic dis-
tribution satisfies, we have, in Eq. (1):
∑
l′∈LD0(~σ,T )
ξl′ =
1. For this reference class therefore, the first-person like-
lihood is independent of the functional form of the xe-
rographic distribution, and reduces to the appropriate
third-person likelihood: P (1p)(D0|T , ξ) −→ P (D0|T ).
B. Preferred xerographic distributions
The likelihood introduced in Eq. (1) can be analyzed
from a Bayesian perspective, which, under the appro-
priate conditions, allows us to pick out a preferred xe-
rographic distribution. As detailed by Srednicki and
Hartle [19], one can compute the posterior probability
P (1p)(T , ξ|D0) by Bayes’ theorem
P (1p)(T , ξ|D0) =
P (1p)(D0|T , ξ)P (T , ξ)∑
(T ,ξ) P
(1p)(D0|T , ξ)P (T , ξ)
, (2)
where P (T , ξ) is the prior probability of the framework
(T , ξ). We will be working below in a simplified set-
ting where we assume we have a set of equally plausible
frameworks at our disposal. That is, each framework en-
ters into our Bayesian analysis with an equal prior. This
implies the posterior probability is simply proportional
to the likelihood:
P (1p)(T , ξ|D0) ∝ P
(1p)(D0|T , ξ), (3)
and the question of which framework is to be preferred
(by virtue of having the highest posterior probability),
becomes a question of which framework gives rise to the
highest likelihood P (1p)(D0|T , ξ). It is from this pre-
ferred framework that one can select a preferred xero-
graphic distribution. Given that we will use these distri-
butions to encode assumptions regarding typicality, this
selection will allow us to infer, in particular, how typical
we are.
C. Testing mediocrity
How then do we propose to test the principle of medi-
ocrity? In the language introduced above, we can formu-
late a more precise version of the principle of mediocrity
as follows:
PM: We are typical of the entirety of the ref-
erence class of observers in the multiverse who
measure our data D0. That is, in cases where
there are (a finite number of) L observers who
measure D0, situated at spacetime locations
xl for l = 1, 2, . . . , L, the probability that we
are any one of these observers is 1
L
. The cor-
responding xerographic distribution is given
by ξl =
1
L
, for l = 1, 2, . . . , L.
4In what follows, we will denote the xerographic distribu-
tion implementing PM by ξPM. Any other xerographic
distribution, with either a non-uniform distribution over
the reference class referred to in PM, or else any distri-
bution over a reference class that is not the one referred
to there, constitutes some form of non-mediocrity.
With the assumptions of section II B in mind, we pro-
pose to test the principle of mediocrity by comparing
likelihoods P (1p)(D0|T , ξPM) against P (1p)(D0|T ⋆, ξ⋆),
where ξ⋆ 6= ξPM, and where we allow for the possibil-
ity that the underlying theory T can vary as well.
III. EXTENDING THE COSMOLOGICAL
MODEL OF SREDNICKI AND HARTLE
To explicate the schema of section II, and to probe the
plausibility ofPM in more concrete settings, we now con-
struct a generalization of the cosmological toy model pre-
sented by Srednicki and Hartle [19] (see also their earlier
paper [16]). In section III D, we will demonstrate that our
results for likelihoods for this extended model reproduce
theirs under the appropriate simplifying assumptions.
A. Model preliminaries
Let V = {1, 2, . . . , N} label N distinct domains in a
multiverse, each of which is assumed to have one of two
‘colors’, red or blue, corresponding to two possible values
of some physical observable. The precise interpretation
of this observable will not matter, and we will rely only
on the fact of it taking two distinct values.
Observers may exist in these domains with some prob-
ability, where we assume this probability is independent
of the color of any domain. As outlined in section II A, we
characterize this probability by first introducing a vector
of observer occupancy (or a ‘configuration’) via the no-
tation ~σ := (σ1, σ2, . . . , σN ), where, for i = 1, 2, . . . , N ,
σi = 1 denotes the existence of observers in domain i,
and σi = 0 denotes there are no observers in domain i.
There will, of course, be 2N such configurations ~σ, the
set of which we label K.
We will further assume that the probability of ob-
servers in a domain is independent of that for all the
other domains, but also that these probabilities are not
generally the same.3 This implies that the probabil-
ity of ~σ, denoted by P (~σ), factorizes into a product of
3 The general results below (in section IV) do not depend on any
assumption that the different domains receive independent but
unequal (or even equal) probabilities. However, it is natural to
assume that (a) the existence of observers in different domains
constitute probabilistically independent events (e.g., due to sep-
arate processes of evolution), and (b) that these probabilities can
be unequal, reflecting the fact that different domains can vary in
their hostility to life.
marginals Pi(σi): P (~σ) =
∏N
i=1 Pi(σi). If we let pi de-
note the probability of the existence of observers in do-
main i, then (1 − pi) is the probability of no observers
in that domain, and since σi = 1 or 0, we can write
Pi(σi) = p
σi
i (1− pi)
1−σi , giving
P (~σ) =
N∏
i=1
pσii (1 − pi)
1−σi . (4)
As to our data, we assume: we exist within one of these
domains and observe the color red. That is, our data D0
is
D0: There exists a domain with observers in it who see
red.
To write down the first-person likelihood for our data
in accord with Eq. (1), we also need to specify the theories
and the xerographic distributions we are interested in.
The theories we consider are ones that specify the color
of each of the N domains. In particular, each theory will
be denoted by a vector T = (T1, T2, . . . , TN), where, for
i = 1, 2, . . . , N , Ti = 1 when the theory predicts that
domain i is red, and Ti = 0 when the theory predicts it
is blue.
The xerographic distributions we consider will be de-
fined to take the value zero, for each domain outside some
nonempty subset (among all possible (nonempty) sub-
sets) of domains V = {1, 2, . . . , N} in the multiverse. To
fix notation, if we let C denote the power set of V exclud-
ing the empty set, i.e., C = 2V\∅, then a nonempty subset
of domains c ∈ C, outside which a xerographic distribu-
tion must be zero, will be denoted by c = {v1, v2, . . . , vM}
(where, of course, 1 ≤ M ≤ N). The vα’s are simply in-
tegers labeling different domains in V . We will explicitly
write xerographic distributions as ξc, with the subscript
c indicating the subset over which they can be nonzero
(so this subset c is a superset of the support of a xero-
graphic distribution). For the sake of simplicity, we will
assume that the elements of c are listed in increasing or-
der, though nothing physical in what follows will depend
on this.
Then for each possible c, our xerographic distributions
will fall into two classes:
C1 The first class of xerographic distributions assumes
that we are typical among instances of observers
who see our data D0, and will be denoted by ξ
typD
c .
C2 The second class of xerographic distributions as-
sumes we are typical among instances of observers,
regardless of what data they see (i.e., regardless of
whether they measure red or blue for their partic-
ular domain). These distributions will be denoted
by ξtypOc .
Note that only one of the xerographic distributions
imposes PM, namely, ξPM := ξtypDV . That is, the princi-
ple of mediocrity is represented by the distribution that
assumes we are typical among all instances of our data
5over the multiverse (note that c = V for this distribu-
tion). Under the assumptions laid out in section II C,
any other xerographic distribution encodes some form of
non-mediocrity.
With these preliminaries in mind, we can construct the
analog of Eq. (1) for our multiverse model. We will do
so separately for C1 and C2 above. We turn first to
C2: where we will construct the first-person likelihood
for our dataD0, assuming we are typical among instances
of observers, regardless of their data, as encoded by ξtypOc .
B. Construction of P (1p)(D0|T , ξ
typO
c )
As indicated in the outer sum of Eq. (1), the def-
inition of the first-person likelihood for our data D0,
sums over the subset KD0(T ) of configurations that con-
tain our data, according to theory T . Keeping in mind
that any xerographic distribution must be zero outside a
nonempty subset c = {v1, v2, . . . , vM} of multiverse do-
mains V , we let KD0(c, T ) ⊂ K denote the corresponding
subset, i.e. the subset of all configurations ~σ that contain
instances of our data D0, according to theory T , within
the domains specified by c.
Next we need to characterize the xerographic distri-
bution ξtypOc . For a configuration ~σ ∈ KD0(c, T ), the
total number of observers within c = {v1, v2, . . . , vM} is
simply
∑M
α=1 σvα ; and the xerographic distribution cor-
responding to ξtypOc , assigns to the location xl of each
observer-system in c, the value ξl = 1/(
∑M
α=1 σvα) (re-
calling that a location in our model is simply a multi-
verse domain). In the computation of the first-person
likelihood, we sum the xerographic distribution over only
those locations that contain instances of our data D0. So
to that end, following our notation in Eq. (1), for each
configuration ~σ ∈ KD0(c, T ), let LD0(c, ~σ, T ) denote the
subset of locations in c, where our data D0 exists, ac-
cording to T . Note that the total number of instances of
our data in c is the just the size of this set |LD0(c, ~σ, T )|.
This can be written as |LD0(c, ~σ, T )| =
∑M
β=1 σvβTvβ :
the dummy variable vβ on the right hand side shows the
c-dependence; and although there is no explicit D0 de-
pendence, recall that Tvβ = 1 iff domain vβ is red, which,
when σvβ = 1, corresponds to the existence of our data
D0 in domain vβ .
We can now calculate a closed-form expression for
P (1p)(D0|T , ξtypOc ), by directly adapting Eq. (1) for the
particular case considered here:
P (1p)(D0|T , ξ
typO
c ) =
∑
~σ∈KD0(c,T )
P (~σ)
∑
l′∈LD0(c,~σ,T )
ξl′
=
∑
~σ∈KD0(c,T )
N∏
i=1
pσii (1 − pi)
1−σi
∑
l′∈LD0(c,~σ,T )
ξl′
=
∑
~σ∈KD0(c,T )
N∏
i=1
pσii (1 − pi)
1−σi
∑
l′∈LD0(c,~σ,T )
1∑M
α=1 σvα
=
∑
~σ∈KD0(c,T )
N∏
i=1
pσii (1 − pi)
1−σi
1∑M
α=1 σvα
|LD0(c, ~σ, T )|
=
∑
~σ∈KD0(c,T )
N∏
i=1
pσii (1 − pi)
1−σi
(∑M
β=1 σvβTvβ∑M
α=1 σvα
)
; (5)
where we have used Eq. (4) to obtain the second line, and
the fact that the value of the xerographic distribution is
the same at each location l′ ∈ LD0(c, ~σ, T ) to obtain the
fourth line.
C. Construction of P (1p)(D0|T , ξ
typD
c )
We turn next to C1, and the construction of the
first-person likelihood for our data D0, assuming we
are typical among instances of our data, as encoded by
ξtypDc . Having completed the above construction, it is
straightforward to compute this. For a configuration ~σ ∈
KD0(c, T ), since the total number of observers who see
our data within c is
∑M
α=1 σvαTvα , the xerographic distri-
bution corresponding to ξtypDc is ξl = 1/(
∑M
α=1 σvαTvα)
for each location xl of our data in c. The term that
imposes the xerographic distribution in the computation
of the first-person likelihood, namely
∑
l′∈LD0(c,~σ,T )
ξl′ ,
is then simply unity:
∑
l′∈LD0(c,~σ,T )
ξl′ = 1. Hence, we
find
P (1p)(D0|T , ξ
typD
c ) =
∑
~σ∈KD0(c,T )
N∏
i=1
pσii (1− pi)
1−σi . (6)
6Note that we recover the analog of the claim in the last
paragraph of section IIA: that for C1, the first-person
likelihood P (1p)(D0|T , ξtypDc ), is equal to the appropriate
third-person likelihood—which expresses the likelihood
that there is at least one observing system that witnesses
our data D0, among the multiverse domains specified by
c.
Equations (5) and (6) are the appropriate generaliza-
tions of the likelihoods calculated for the cyclic cosmo-
logical model of Srednicki and Hartle [19]. In order to
make this connection more precise, and to set the stage
for some of the computations described in section IV, we
now show that in the case where our multiverse model re-
duces to the cosmological model of Srednicki and Hartle
[19], Eqs. (5) and (6) indeed reduce to their likelihoods.
D. A multiverse of cycles
Consider, then, the case where the N domains of the
multiverse model introduced in section III A are stretched
out in time, so that the index i that labels a domain, cor-
responds to the order in which the domain occurs in what
we will refer to as a ‘multiverse of cycles’. Assume further
that the xerographic distribution can be nonzero for each
of these domains, so that c = V . Furthermore, assume,
as in [19], that the probability of observers existing in
each of these cycles is the same (as well as independent
of whether they exist in other cycles), and is given by
pi = p. We wish to first calculate the likelihood of our
data under the assumption that we are typical among all
instances of observers, i.e., P (1p)(D0|T , ξ
typO
V ). Under
these assumptions, Eq. (5) reduces to
P (1p)(D0|T , ξ
typO
V ) =
∑
~σ∈KD0(V,T )
p
∑N
i=1
σi(1− p)N−
∑
N
j=1 σj
(∑N
m=1 σmTm∑N
n=1 σn
)
. (7)
The large amount of symmetry in this expression al-
lows us to organize the outermost sum by separately con-
sidering configurations ~σ according to the total number
of observers
∑N
i=1 σi in each configuration. We will call
the total number of observers in each configuration nO,
and note that this will range from 1 to N for consis-
tency with the fact that there exists at least one cycle
with observers, that is, for consistency with our data
(recall that we are not counting how many individuals
are in each domain, just whether domains house ob-
servers or not). Equation (7) can then be thought of
as P (1p)(D0|T , ξ
typO
V ) =
∑N
nO=1
F (p, nO, NR), for some
function F we will compute below, where NR denotes
the total number of red cycles predicted by the theory
T . There are two obvious cases to consider in this sum:
namely, 1 ≤ nO ≤ NR and NR < nO ≤ N , and we
formally treat these two cases separately.
For 1 ≤ nO ≤ NR, one can generate an expression
for F (p, nO, NR) by sequentially considering all possible
numbers of observers (out of a maximum of nO observers)
placed in NR red cycles. In general, one finds
F (p, nO, NR) = p
nO(1 − p)N−nO
1
nO
[(
NR
nO
)
nO +
(
NR
nO − 1
)(
N −NR
1
)
(nO − 1) + · · ·+
(
NR
1
)(
N −NR
nO − 1
)]
= pnO(1 − p)N−nO
1
nO
nO−1∑
k=0
(
NR
nO − k
)(
N −NR
k
)
(nO − k)
= pnO(1 − p)N−nO
1
nO
NR
nO−1∑
k=0
(
N −NR
k
)(
NR − 1
nO − 1− k
)
= pnO(1 − p)N−nO
1
nO
NR
(
N − 1
nO − 1
)
= pnO(1 − p)N−nONR
1
N
(
N
nO
)
, (8)
where we have used a standard binomial identity to
obtain the third and fifth lines, together with Vander-
monde’s identity to obtain the fourth one.
In the case where NR < nO ≤ N , it is not difficult to
show that we obtain precisely the same final result using
a similar sequence of steps. Putting this all together,
7gives
P (1p)(D0|T , ξ
typO
V ) =
NR
N
N∑
nO=1
(
N
nO
)
pnO(1− p)N−nO
=
NR
N
[
1− (1− p)N
]
, (9)
agreeing with the corresponding expression (Eqs. (5.8)
and (B5)) in [19].
A similar calculation (presented in the appendix) gives
the correct formula for P (1p)(D0|T , ξPM) (recall that
ξPM := ξtypDV ), where
P (1p)(D0|T , ξ
PM) = 1− (1− p)NR , (10)
corresponding to Eq. (5.5) in [19]. In this way, the gen-
eralized multiverse model introduced in section IIIA re-
duces to the cyclic model of Srednicki and Hartle [19]
under the appropriate simplifying assumptions.
IV. EVALUATING THE PRINCIPLE OF
MEDIOCRITY
With the results of the last section in hand, we can
now address the central conceptual task of this paper:
namely, to assess the predictive power (understood in
Bayesian terms) of the principle of mediocrity, under the
scheme introduced in section II. We will develop the an-
swers to three central questions in turn: (A) What frame-
work produces the highest likelihoods? (B) For a fixed
theory, what xerographic distribution gives rise to the
framework with the highest likelihoods? (C) Does the
principle of mediocrity generally provide the framework
with the highest likelihoods?
A. The best performing framework
To begin our analysis, we show that the framework
whose likelihood attains the supremum of the likeli-
hoods for all frameworks considered, and for all assign-
ments of probabilities {pi}Ni=1 to multiverse domains, is
(Tall red, ξPM): that is, the theory that predicts each of
the domains is red (T = Tall red), together with the xe-
rographic distribution corresponding to the principle of
mediocrity (ξ = ξPM := ξtypDV ). For this framework,
the likelihood attained is the same as that with a xero-
graphic distribution corresponding to typicality across all
observers for c = V , that is, for ξ = ξtypOV .
To show this, let the pi’s be arbitrarily chosen but
fixed. Note first that for arbitrary c and T , Eqs. (5)
and (6) imply P (1p)(D0|T , ξtypOc ) ≤ P
(1p)(D0|T , ξtypDc ):
as the same configurations ~σ ∈ KD0(c, T ) contribute to
the sums in Eqs. (5) and (6), but in the case of Eq. (5),
each contributing term is multiplied by a factor that
is less than or equal to 1. Now, the maximal value
of P (1p)(D0|T , ξtypDc ) is attained when we choose c and
T such that KD0(c, T ) includes the maximal number of
configurations in the sum over (manifestly non-negative)
probabilities of configurations. This will occur for the
case where all multiverse domains are included (c = V)
and for the theory that predicts that all domains are
red. Note finally that for T = Tall red ≡ (1, 1, . . . , 1),∑M
β=1 σvβTvβ =
∑M
α=1 σvα (regardless of c), and so the
final term in brackets in Eq. (5) is unity; hence the likeli-
hood for the framework (Tall red, ξPM), coincides with the
likelihood for (Tall red, ξ
typO
V ).
To see how these conclusions manifest in a particular
setting, consider the multiverse of cycles introduced in
section III D, which assumes that the probability of ob-
servers existing in any cycle is the same for each cycle
and is given by p. We will consider the case where the
xerographic distribution can be nonzero only on an initial
segment of cycles starting with the first cycle and ending
with some terminal cycle (after which the xerographic
distribution is assumed to be zero). So for any number
of cycles N , there are a total of N such possible ‘cut-off
schemes’. Figure 1 shows likelihoods as a function of p
for the case where N = 3. We see that the highest likeli-
hoods indeed occur for the framework with (Tall red, ξPM)
(uppermost trace in Fig. 1 (left)), and that these like-
lihoods coincide with the likelihoods for (Tall red, ξ
typO
V )
(uppermost trace in Fig. 1 (right)).
B. The best xerographic distribution for a fixed
theory
It is an encouraging check of our intuition that the
framework with the highest likelihood (and so also the
highest posterior probability under the assumptions of
section II B) involves the theory that predicts all domains
are red. A natural question that arises is: for a fixed the-
ory, what xerographic distribution leads to the best per-
forming framework? It does not take much more work
to show that under these circumstances, the framework
whose likelihood attains the supremum of the likelihoods
over all xerographic distributions considered, for all as-
signments of probabilities pi to the multiverse domains,
is the one whose xerographic distribution corresponds to
PM: ξ = ξPM := ξtypDV .
To prove this, fix the theory T and let the pi’s
be arbitrarily chosen but fixed. For an arbitrary c,
we showed in section IVA that P (1p)(D0|T , ξtypOc ) ≤
P (1p)(D0|T , ξtypDc ). Now, as in the proof there, the choice
of c that will maximize P (1p)(D0|T , ξtypDc ) is the one that
will include the most number of non-negative terms in the
sum in Eq. (6). This is just c = V , and hence (T , ξPM)
will in general give the highest likelihood.
We see how this claim manifests in a simple case, by
again considering the multiverse of cycles introduced in
section IIID, with xerographic distributions implement-
ing a cut-off in time, as described in the last paragraph
of section IVA. Figure 2 displays plots of the difference
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FIG. 1. (Left): First-person likelihoods for our data D0, given a theory T and a xerographic distribution ξ
typD
c , for a multiverse
of cycles with a total of 3 cycles (see section IIID). The theories considered include all possible theories assigning the observable
red/blue to each cycle (for a total of 23 theories), and the xerographic distributions can be nonzero only up to (and including)
some terminal cycle (corresponding to the final element of c). We implement the assumption that we are typical with respect
to other instances of our data up to (and including) that terminal cycle (for a total of 3 possible xerographic distributions; see
C1 of section IIIA). Likelihoods are shown as a function of p, the probability of the existence of observers in each cycle, which
is here assumed to be the same for each cycle. Likelihoods for all possible frameworks (found by varying T and c—a total of
24 frameworks) have been superimposed on the plot. In this case, the existence of equivalent functional forms for likelihoods
for different frameworks, gives rise to 4 distinct traces (including likelihoods which are zero for all values of p). The uppermost
trace corresponds only to the framework (Tall red, ξ
PM := ξtypDV ), and is the supremum of the likelihoods for all possible values
of p. (Right): This plot displays similar information as in the left panel, but for the xerographic distribution that assumes we
are typical of all observers, regardless of what data they see (C2 of section IIIA). Here, the existence of equivalent functional
forms for likelihoods for different frameworks, gives rise to 7 distinct traces (again, including likelihoods which are zero for all
values of p). The uppermost trace is the same as the uppermost trace for the left panel, and corresponds only to the framework
(Tall red, ξ
typO
V ).
between the likelihood for the framework with some the-
ory T and xerographic distribution corresponding to the
principle of mediocrity ξ = ξPM := ξtypDV , and the like-
lihood for the framework with the same theory and all
other xerographic distributions (the probability p of ob-
servers in domains, labels the x-axis of each subplot).
The case for N = 3 cycles is displayed. We see that for
each row of the plot (corresponding to a fixed theory),
the difference is non-negative in each case, confirming the
general claim advanced in this section.
C. Does the principle of mediocrity generally give
rise to the most predictive frameworks?
In light of the results in the last two subsections it is
natural to ask whether there are cases where PM does
not provide the highest likelihoods. We will show by
construction that indeed it does not, when one is allowed
to vary both the underlying theory and the xerographic
distribution. For the sake of simplicity, we will restrict
attention to the multiverse of cycles introduced in sec-
tion III D, where again, the probability of observers in
any cycle is the same for each cycle and is given by p.
There is a strong motivation for embarking on this
search, since some well-motivated theories suggest xe-
rographic distributions which do not express the prin-
ciple of mediocrity. We will further explicate such sce-
narios in the next section; but for now, we aim to figure
out whether in such instances, likelihoods are generally
highest for those frameworks that involve the principle of
mediocrity.
To be explicit about the terms for our search: we
are interested in whether for a given framework char-
acterized by PM, that is, for some ‘reference framework’
(T , ξPM := ξtypDV ), there could exist another framework
(T ⋆, ξ⋆) with a higher likelihood for at least some val-
ues of p. To steer the discussion away from more trivial
cases, we will only consider situations where:
(i) T 6= Tall red: since otherwise, by the results of sec-
tion IVA, we will not be able to find the required
framework (T ⋆, ξ⋆).
(ii) T 6= Tno red: where Tno red = (0, 0, . . . , 0) is the
theory that predicts no red cycles; since then the
likelihood of our data D0, given the framework
(Tno red, ξPM), vanishes, and we will be able to find
the required frameworks (T ⋆, ξ⋆) rather trivially.
(iii) ξ⋆ 6= ξPM: since we already know from section IVA
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FIG. 2. The multiverse of cycles introduced in section III D with N = 3 cycles. Each subplot shows [P (1p)(D0|T , ξ
PM) −
P (1p)(D0|T , ξ
typX
c )] vs p (where X is either D or O). The term in square brackets is the difference between the first-person
likelihood for the framework that implements the principle of mediocrity, namely (T , ξPM := ξtypDV ), and the likelihood for
another framework specified by varying only the xerographic distribution in accord with the cut-off procedure described in
the last paragraph of section IVA. The variable p (labeling the x-axis of each subplot) is the probability of the occurrence of
observers in any cycle (and is assumed to be the same in each cycle). The theory is shown on the left of each row, with 1 or 0
respectively denoting the prediction of red or blue in the corresponding cycle. The xerographic distribution against which we
are comparing the principle of mediocrity is shown on the top of each column (traces referring to ξtypOc are shown in grey to
guide the eye). We see that for each row, that is, for a fixed theory, the difference is non-negative for all possible values of p.
It is in this sense that we claim the best xerographic distribution for a fixed theory is that corresponding to the principle of
mediocrity.
that for ξ⋆ = ξPM, T ⋆ = Tall red will provide
the supremum of the likelihoods in this case—and
moreover, we are interested in finding frameworks
where PM is not integral to constructing higher
likelihoods.
(iv) (T ⋆, ξ⋆) 6= (Tall red, ξ
typO
V ): since again, this cor-
responds to the supremum as mentioned in (iii),
following the results of section IVA.
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So consider the case N = 3. Set T in our reference
framework (T , ξPM), to be the theory that predicts a to-
tal of one of the three cycles is red: T = Tone red. Then,
from Eq. (10), we have P (1p)(D0|Tone red, ξPM) = p. It
is straightforward to show from Eq. (5) that for the
theory that predicts only the first two cycles are red,
which we will denote by T ⋆ = (1, 1, 0) ≡ TRRB , the xe-
rographic distribution given by ξtypO
c={1,2}, which (clearly)
does not correspond to the principle of mediocrity, im-
plies: P (1p)(D0|TRRB , ξ
typO
c={1,2}) = p(2−p). So the frame-
work (TRRB , ξ
typO
c={1,2}) has a likelihood higher than the
framework involving PM, since p(2−p) > p (for all non-
trivial values of p, i.e. p ∈ (0, 1)).
More interesting behavior can be exhibited for the case
where we take T ⋆ to be the theory that predicts a total
of two of the cycles are red and the xerographic distribu-
tion to be ξtypOV ≡ ξ
typO
c={1,2,3}. In this case, as seen from
Eq. (9), P (1p)(D0|Ttwo red, ξ
typO
V ) =
2
3p(p
2− 3p+3). This
likelihood displays the behavior that it does better than
our reference framework (Tone red, ξPM), depending on the
value of p. In particular, for p >∼ 0.63, (Tone red, ξPM)
has a higher likelihood than (Ttwo red, ξ
typO
V ), whereas the
situation is reversed otherwise. Such behavior thereby
exhibits parametric dependence of the success of PM.
Both this situation and the one discussed in the last para-
graph are displayed graphically in Fig. 3 (left).
Similar results can be obtained in the case whereN = 4
(see Fig. 3 (right)). In this case, there exists a frame-
work implementing PM with P (1p)(D0|Ttwo red, ξPM) =
p(2 − p). This is less than or equal to the likelihood
P (1p)(D0|TRRRB, ξ
typO
c={1,2,3}) = p(p
2 − 3p + 3), for all p,
which assumes a theory where only the first three cycles
are red (T ⋆ = (1, 1, 1, 0) ≡ TRRRB). In addition, our
reference framework’s likelihood P (1p)(D0|Ttwo red, ξPM)
displays only parametric dominance over the likelihood
associated with another framework not implementing
PM, namely (Tthree red, ξ
typO
V ), which takes the value
P (1p)(D0|Tthree red, ξ
typO
V ) =
3
4p(4−6p+4p
2−p3). Again,
interestingly, PM does not universally give rise to the
highest likelihoods and in certain cases exhibits only a
parameter-dependent dominance.
V. DISCUSSION
The principle of mediocrity is a controversial issue in
multiverse cosmology. According to one way of think-
ing, it articulates our intuitions about how one should
reason from an appropriately defined, peaked probabil-
ity distribution, to a prediction of a possible observation.
But crucially, this intuition has been developed either in
controlled laboratory settings, or more generally, in cases
where we understand, and have some (at least theoreti-
cal) control over, the conditions that obtain in systems
of interest. The multiverse, however, is a different story.
It is plausible that we aremore typical of a set of appro-
priately restricted multiverse domains, but whether we
can positively assert typicality heavily depends on who or
what is predicted by the theories and the conditionaliza-
tion schemes which we consider in multiverse cosmology.
These latter schemes, at best, set down conditions that
are necessary for the presence of ‘observers’, but there
is an ambiguity in defining precisely who or what these
observers are. In addition we do not know precisely what
parameters or conditions need to be fixed within the con-
fines of any theory in order to unambiguously describe
these observers. As a result, it is not clear that typical-
ity is justified, even if we conditionalize in accord with
the ‘ideal reference class’ of Garriga and Vilenkin [17].
Of course, we may be typical, but following this line of
thinking, we do not have good reason to assert that we
are.
The formalism of Srednicki and Hartle [19] allows one
to neatly address this multi-faceted concern, which af-
fects our ability to reason in multiverse scenarios [20].
Through their formalism, one can formulate a set of as-
sumptions regarding typicality, and from this set, one can
calculate relevant likelihoods for possible observations, to
then see how well different assumptions do in terms of
describing our observations. This is implemented in a
Bayesian framework, so that if, as we have assumed in
this paper (see section II B), we can assign equal amounts
of prior credence to various candidate frameworks, then
higher likelihoods translate to greater support for those
frameworks given relevant experimental data. From the
framework with the highest posterior probability then,
one can infer how typical we are.
How well does typicality do? As we have discovered
within the admittedly simplified multiverse setting of sec-
tion III: for a fixed theory, the principle of mediocrity
yields likelihoods for our data that attain the supremum
of all likelihoods considered, for all values of the proba-
bilities of observers in domains.
But an important caveat is that this result is not uni-
versal. Namely, if one is allowed to vary both the the-
ory and the xerographic distribution implementing as-
sumptions regarding typicality, the principle of medi-
ocrity does not always provide the highest likelihoods.
This is particularly pertinent when the set of candidate
frameworks that constitute plausible alternatives for the
description of a physical situation, do not always include
xerographic distributions implementing the principle of
mediocrity.
One example where this occurs is in the situation where
‘Boltzmann brains’ exist and out-number ordinary ob-
servers, but both sets of observers record the same data
(see the discussion in [19], as well as [21–23]). In this
case, the first-person likelihood of our observations might
be higher under the principle of mediocrity; but an un-
wanted consequence of favoring the corresponding frame-
work, is the high likelihood of us being Boltzmann brains.
That is, this framework would also predict that our fu-
ture measurements will be disordered, that is, uncorre-
lated with past measurements (as is presumed for Boltz-
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FIG. 3. (Left): First-person likelihoods for our data D0, given a particular theory T and xerographic distributions ξ
typX
c (where
X is either D or O), vs p, for the multiverse of cycles introduced in section IIID for N = 3. The likelihoods for three separate
frameworks are shown. The black line shows the likelihood for the framework (Tone red, ξ
PM := ξtypDV ), where the theory predicts
a single red cycle and the xerographic distribution corresponds to the principle of mediocrity [P (1p)(D0|Tone red, ξ
PM) = p]. The
uppermost grey trace corresponds to the framework (TRRB , ξ
typO
c={1,2}), where the theory predicts only the first two cycles are
red (TRRB ≡ (1, 1, 0)), and the xerographic distribution corresponds to typicality with respect to observers considered among
only the first two cycles [P (1p)(D0|TRRB , ξ
typO
c={1,2}
) = p(2− p)]. We note that this framework does better than that containing a
xerographic distribution implementing the principle of mediocrity. The lower grey trace corresponds to the likelihood for the
framework (Ttwo red, ξ
typO
V ), whose theory predicts that some two of the cycles are red, and that we are typical with respect to
observers considered over the entire multiverse [P (1p)(D0|Ttwo red, ξ
typO
V ) =
2
3
p(p2−3p+3)]. This trace crosses the likelihood for
(Tone red, ξ
PM), implying a parametric dependence of the dominance of the framework implementing the principle of mediocrity.
The cross-over point of this dependence occurs for p ∼ 0.63. (Right): Similar results for the case N = 4. Here, the black
trace shows the likelihood for the framework implementing the principle of mediocrity with P (1p)(D0|Ttwo red, ξ
PM) = p(2− p).
The uppermost trace corresponds to P (1p)(D0|TRRRB, ξ
typO
c={1,2,3}
) = p(p2− 3p+ 3) (where TRRRB ≡ (1, 1, 1, 0)). The lower grey
trace corresponds to the likelihood P (1p)(D0|Tthree red, ξ
typO
V ) = 3p(4 − 6p + 4p
2 − p3)/4. In this latter case, the principle of
mediocrity is only dominant for p >∼ 0.42.
mann brains). One way to avoid having to accept this
consequence is by restricting the xerographic distribution
accordingly—for example, by focussing attention on only
a proper subset of appropriately chosen domains. This
type of restriction has been actively developed in this pa-
per, and is equivalent to an assumption of non-mediocrity
under the scheme described in section II.4
To sum up: if some of the frameworks one consid-
ers have xerographic distributions that do not implement
4 One might wonder why we do not simply reject a theory that
when partnered with the principle of mediocrity, does not con-
stitute a plausible candidate framework. A response in the spirit
of this paper, is that when the status of the principle of medi-
ocrity is uncertain, it makes sense to examine the predictions
of frameworks that constrain otherwise well-motivated theories
by assumptions of non-mediocrity. A more pointed response is
that one is simply not justified in rejecting a theory just because
we would not be typical according to that theory. Hartle and
Srednicki [16] raise this objection in discussing a (hypothetical)
theory that predicts the existence of many more observers on
Jupiter than on Earth. They claim it is unreasonable to reject
such a theory, when we notice we are human and not Jovian, just
because we would not be typical according to the theory.
the principle of mediocrity for relevant theories, then de-
manding that we favor a framework that includes the
principle of mediocrity is hazardous. For as shown in
section IVC, we cannot guarantee it will produce the
framework with the highest likelihood.
It is important to note that we have selected a partic-
ular reference class within which to implement the prin-
ciple of mediocrity—namely, observers who witness our
experimental data. The motivation for this choice was
to test a limiting case of a ‘top-down’ approach to con-
ditionalization (see [14, 17, 18, 24] for further details on
top-down approaches). This limiting case requires con-
sideration of the maximally specific reference class in the
setup at hand. The assumption of typicality with re-
spect to this reference class (encoded in ξtypDV ) then cor-
responds to the principle of mediocrity. A key result in
this paper is that typicality with respect to this reference
class does not necessarily give rise to the highest likeli-
hoods for our data D0, if one is allowed to vary both the
theory and the xerographic distribution under consider-
ation (as explained in section IVC).
It is also important to note that we have evaluated
frameworks based on first-person likelihoods generated
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for our data D0. These computations are in accordance
with the approach adopted by Srednicki and Hartle [19,
§IV], who invoke such likelihoods in the evaluation of
frameworks (where they also use xerographic distribu-
tions that correspond to each of ξtypOV and ξ
typD
V ).
Another significant question to address, that mani-
festly goes beyond the cosmological settings studied in
this paper, is: how should one evaluate the predictive
power of frameworks (and in particular, the principle of
mediocrity) in a case where one aims to predict the value
of an observable, say, that is not explicitly included in
the conditionalization scheme adopted? For realistic cos-
mological calculations, securing the required separation
of the observable from the conditionalization scheme is
non-trivial. One naturally requires that the observable
being predicted is (i) correlated with the conditionaliza-
tion scheme (otherwise the conditionalization scheme will
play no role in the predictive framework), but (ii) is not
perfectly correlated with the conditionalization scheme
(otherwise one is open to the charge of circularity). Thus
when it is not clear exactly how observables are correlated
with the defining features of a conditionalization scheme,
the need to strike a balance between (i) and (ii) gives rise
to a difficult problem—namely, how to distinguish the
observable to be predicted, from the defining features of
the conditionalization scheme (see Garriga and Vilenkin
[17, §III] who mention such concerns).
Assuming that one has a solution to this problem, a
formalism that can handle this type of predictive setting
is described by Srednicki and Hartle [19, §VI]. For the
computation of first-person likelihoods, the appropriate
way to proceed, as detailed by Garriga and Vilenkin [17]
and Hartle and Hertog [25, 26], is to explicitly leave out
that part of our data that involves the observable we aim
to predict, in the specification of our conditionalization
scheme. The assumption of typicality with respect to
the reference class implicit in this specification, would
then be the appropriate implementation of the principle
of mediocrity [17].
It remains to apply the methods introduced by Sred-
nicki and Hartle [19], and advanced in this paper, to more
realistic cosmological settings, in order to more fully as-
sess the extent of the errors that may arise from univer-
sally imposing the principle of mediocrity (see [25, 26]
for recent work in this direction). For now, our con-
clusion must be that the principle of mediocrity (in the
style of [10–13, 17]) is more questionable than has been
claimed.
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Appendix: Calculation of P (1p)(D0|T , ξ
PM) for the
multiverse of cycles
For the sake of completeness, we present the calcu-
lation for the first-person likelihood of our data D0,
given a theory T , under the assumption of a xerographic
distribution that imposes the principle of mediocrity,
ξ = ξPM := ξtypDV . We work within the cyclic cosmo-
logical model of Srednicki and Hartle [19] under the as-
sumptions of section IIID; where we have N domains
stretched out in time, each with a probability p of hous-
ing observers. From these assumptions, Eq. (6) reduces
to
P (1p)(D0|T , ξ
PM) =
∑
~σ∈KD0(V,T )
p
∑
N
i=1 σi(1− p)N−
∑N
j=1
σj . (A.1)
We organize the sum by separately considering con-
figurations according to the total number of observers
nO =
∑N
i=1 σi in each configuration ~σ. Equa-
tion (A.1) can then be thought of as P (1p)(D0|T , ξPM) =∑N
nO=1
G(p, nO, NR), for some function G we will com-
pute shortly. The total number of red cycles NR depends
on the theory T , and we will separately consider the two
cases into which the sum naturally partitions, namely,
1 ≤ nO ≤ NR and NR < nO ≤ N .
For 1 ≤ nO ≤ NR, we generate an expression for
G(p, nO, NR) by sequentially placing all possible num-
bers of observers (out of a maximum of nO observers) in
NR red cycles. In general, we find
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G(p, nO, NR) = p
nO(1− p)N−nO
[(
NR
nO
)
+
(
NR
nO − 1
)(
N −NR
1
)
+ · · ·+
(
NR
1
)(
N −NR
nO − 1
)]
= pnO(1− p)N−nO
nO−1∑
k=0
(
NR
nO − k
)(
N −NR
k
)
= pnO(1− p)N−nO
[(
N
nO
)
−
(
N −NR
nO
)]
= pnO(1− p)N−nO
NR∑
k=1
(
N − k
nO − 1
)
,
where we have used Vandermonde’s identity in obtaining
the third line, and have iterated using Pascal’s formula
in obtaining the fourth line.
For NR < nO ≤ N , we obtain the same final result us-
ing a similar sequence of steps. Putting this all together,
gives
P (1p)(D0|T , ξ
PM) =
N∑
nO=1
pnO(1− p)N−nO
NR∑
k=1
(
N − k
nO − 1
)
=
NR∑
k=1
N−k+1∑
nO=1
(
N − k
nO − 1
)
pnO(1 − p)N−nO
=
NR∑
k=1
p(1− p)k−1
N−k∑
m=0
(
N − k
m
)
pm(1− p)N−k−m
= p
NR∑
k=1
(1 − p)k−1
= 1− (1− p)NR , (A.2)
where we have used the binomial theorem to obtain the
fourth line. This agrees with the corresponding expres-
sion (Eq. (5.5)) in [19], and Eq. (10) in the text above.
[1] A. Vilenkin, Phys. Rev. D 27, 2848 (1983).
[2] A. D. Linde, Phys. Lett. 129B, 177 (1983).
[3] A. D. Linde, Phys. Lett. B 175, 395 (1986).
[4] R. Bousso and J. Polchinski, J. High Energy Phys. 06
(2000) 006.
[5] S. Kachru, R. Kallosh, A. Linde, and S. P. Trivedi, Phys.
Rev. D 68, 046005 (2003).
[6] B. Freivogel, M. Kleban, M. Rodr´ıguez Mart´ınez, and
L. Susskind, J. High Energy Phys. 03 (2006) 039.
[7] L. Susskind, in Universe or Multiverse?, edited by
B. Carr (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2007).
[8] B. Carter, in Confrontation of Cosmological Theories
with Observational Data. IAU Symposium No. 63, edited
by M. S. Longair (D. Reidel Publishing Company, Dor-
drecht + Boston, 1974) pp. 291–298.
[9] J. B. Hartle, in Universe or Multiverse?, edited by
B. Carr (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2007).
[10] A. Vilenkin, Phys. Rev. Lett. 74, 846 (1995).
[11] J. R. Gott III, Nature 363, 315 (1993).
[12] D. N. Page, Int. J. Mod. Phys. D 05, 583 (1996).
[13] N. Bostrom, Anthropic Bias: Observation Selection Ef-
fects in Science and Philosophy (Routledge, New York &
London, 2002).
[14] S. Weinstein, Class. Quantum Grav. 23, 4231 (2006).
[15] L. Smolin, in Universe or Multiverse?, edited by B. Carr
(Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2007).
[16] J. B. Hartle and M. Srednicki, Phys. Rev. D 75, 123523
(2007).
[17] J. Garriga and A. Vilenkin, Phys. Rev. D 77, 043526
(2008).
[18] F. Azhar, Class. Quantum Grav. 31, 035005 (2014).
[19] M. Srednicki and J. Hartle, Phys. Rev. D 81, 123524
(2010).
[20] C. Smeenk, Stud. Hist. Phil. Mod. Phys. 46, 122 (2014).
14
[21] A. Albrecht and L. Sorbo, Phys. Rev. D 70, 063528
(2004).
[22] D. N. Page, J. Cosmol. Astropart. Phys. 10 (2008) 025.
[23] J. R. Gott III, arXiv:0802.0233.
[24] A. Aguirre and M. Tegmark, J. Cosmol. Astropart. Phys.
01 (2005) 003.
[25] J. Hartle and T. Hertog, Phys. Rev. D 88, 123516 (2013).
[26] J. Hartle and T. Hertog, arXiv:1503.07205.
